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Abstract
A single narrative about the Gorongosa Restoration Project (GRP) in Mozambique circulates widely in the popular
media. This story characterises the project as an innovative intervention into an ecological crisis situation. The narrative
hails the project’s aim to use profits from tourism to address the goals of both human development and conservation
of biodiversity, and portrays the park project as widely embraced by long-term residents. This representation helps
the project attract broad acclaim, donor funding, and socially conscious visitors, yet it obscures the early emergence
of unified opposition to the project’s interventions among long-term residents of Gorongosa Mountain. This article
draws on ethnographic research conducted on Gorongosa Mountain between 2006 and 2008 to examine the project’s
early activities there. I examine two crisis narratives that led to entrenched conflict between park-based actors and
mountain residents. Focusing on the emergence and solidification of divergent narratives—narrative fortresses—about
the extension of the park’s activities to Gorongosa Mountain offers insight into the powerful role of crisis narratives
in producing and maintaining conflict, leading to outcomes counter to the desires of conservationists. Ultimately,
the article points to ways in which narratives of environmental crisis work against aspirations of partnership and
collaboration with resident populations in conservation and development schemes.
Keywords: conservation, narrative, community, crisis, land, conflict, sustainable development, Gorongosa
National Park, Mozambique

INTRODUCTION
A single narrative about the Gorongosa Restoration Project
(GRP) in Gorongosa National Park (GNP) has gained widespread
circulation in the popular media. This story characterises the
project as an innovative conservation and development success
story in the making—a win-win combination that is celebrated
by conservation biologists, Mozambican government officials,
foreign tourists, and long term Gorongosa residents. However,
this feel-good story belies a much more complex situation on
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the ground, including animosity and conflict between residents
of Gorongosa Mountain and park actors. In order to better
understand the nature and emergence of this heated and ongoing
conflict, this article analyses how crisis figured in narratives that
oriented differently positioned actors. Key to understanding the
conflict is how crisis claims in both sets of narratives produced
rigid positions—what I will refer to as ‘narrative fortresses’—
where possibilities of compromise or collaboration were
foreclosed, ultimately leading to outcomes counter to the desires
of both conservationists and mountain residents. Analysis of
crisis narratives in this conflict suggests that conservation
and development schemes motivated primarily by stories
of environmental crisis may be fundamentally incompatible
with aspirations for collaboration or partnership with resident
populations.
Below, I examine different narratives that circulated from
2005 to 2008, related to conservation and management
activities in GNP. During this period, interventions to
rehabilitate GNP were managed and conducted through Greg
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Carr’s1 philanthropic organisation, The Gregory C. Carr
Foundation2 and included significant efforts to extend park
management and tourism activities to Gorongosa Mountain
which, at the time, lay more than 20 km outside the boundaries
of GNP. From the very first interaction between park actors and
mountain residents in early 2006, the Carr Foundation’s desire
to incorporate Gorongosa Mountain into its conservation and
development project was met with significant opposition. At
this time, two crisis narratives, one figuring mountain residents
as a threat to the ecology of the mountain and hence the region,
the other figuring the park and its representatives as threatening
outsiders hungry for land, came into conflict, and, like oil and
water, repelled each other and remained separate.
Numerous scholars of conservation and development projects
have observed how narratives emerge in conflicts over land and
resources (Peters 1994; Fortmann 1995; Leach and Mearns
1996; Campbell 2002; Hutton et al. 2005; Dressler et al. 2010).
As discursive strategies, such narratives often emerge as ways
to define and claim resources (Peters 1994; Fortmann 1995).
Louise Fortmann has argued that narratives should be seen not
only as statements or claims, but also as “a medium through
which… events are produced” (Fortmann 1995: 1054). She
identifies how, in the context of land disputes, stories serve as
discursive strategies that do at least three kinds of work: “to
create meaning and validate action; to mobilise action; and to
define alternatives” (Fortmann 1995: 1054). This article builds
on this work, drawing added attention to how evaluations
of crisis and convictions of urgency contribute to a type of
intractable conflict that frequently emerges in conservation and
development projects.
Drawing on Janet Roitman’s examination of the power and
prevalence of the notion of ‘crisis’ in both popular and academic
thought (Roitman 2013), I focus attention on understanding
“the kinds of work the term ‘crisis’ is or is not doing in the
construction of narrative forms” (Roitman 2013: 3). From this
perspective, the goal here is not to evaluate the relative truth or
falsity of the crisis narratives I will discuss below, but rather
to examine how differently positioned actors’ evaluations of
crisis shaped early interactions between Carr Foundation actors
and their supporters and mountain residents, producing an
immediate and enduring conflict. As Roitman demonstrates,
crisis “regulates narrative constructions… [allowing] certain
questions to be asked while others are foreclosed” (Roitman
2013: 94), and “[evokes] a moral demand for a difference
between past and the future” (Roitman 2013: 8). Indeed, in
the case of Gorongosa Mountain, the moral demands inherent
in different narratives of threats to land and resources on
the mountain led differently positioned actors to relinquish
opportunities for negotiation or compromise, narrowing the
range for potential actions and leading actors on either side
of the conflict to transgress norms when faced with obstacles.
A central focus in my analysis is examination of the ways
in which differently positioned actors’ profoundly different
understandings of threats to land and resources on Gorongosa
Mountain became rigidly divided. For actors on both sides of
the conflict that emerged about Gorongosa Mountain, crisis

claims intensified feelings of uncertainty about the future of the
land on the mountain. The element of urgency central to these
narratives led to hardened positions that shaped interpretations
of and responses to the other side’s words and actions, making
positions on either side quite inflexible. My term ‘fortress
narratives’ is shorthand to describe this situation, which
plays on the term ‘fortress conservation’ (Brockington 2002).
While, currently, with thousands of human inhabitants, the
GNP’s extension to include portions of Gorongosa Mountain
is not an example of ‘fortress conservation,’ in fact, tight
fortification of information and thick barriers to the affected
residents’ real involvement in park planning or decision making
have created narrative fortresses impermeable to change or
influence. My use of the term ‘fortress narratives’ also points
to the connections between divergent understandings of threats
to land and resources, and the production of fortress-style
management practices in conservation programmes.
METHODOLOGY
This research draws on over five years spent living in
Gorongosa District. For three and a half of these years I was
conducting ethnographic research split between Gorongosa
Mountain, in an area that is inside the newly designated
boundary to the GNP, and in the district capital. While the
Mozambican government announced their official decision
to expand the park’s boundaries to include the area above
700 meters on the mountain in 2010, after the initial period of
this research, the possibility of this expansion raised the spectre
of dispossession for mountain residents throughout the main
research period (2006-2008).
Given the long-term nature of my involvement in the
region, my research methods have varied. A primary aspect
of my methodology has been residence and participation
in daily life on Gorongosa Mountain. The main period of
research (2006-2008) builds upon relationships, language
skills, and research conducted in previous stays from late
1998 through 2001, and during the June-August academic
breaks of 2003 and 2004. Between mid-2006 and mid-2008 I
conducted research on economic and religious transformations
in the district (Schuetze 2010). During this time I conducted
countless interviews with differently positioned residents
of the Khanda régulado3 on the mountain and participated
in numerous meetings convened by park based actors about
the park’s planned interventions on Gorongosa Mountain. At
each of the meetings, I kept detailed field notes, made and
transcribed digital audio recordings, and when possible,4 made
video recordings. Most recently, I have resided on Gorongosa
Mountain in June and July of 2011. All of this work has afforded
me a long-term view of the area and its transformations.
While my long-term connection to Gorongosa affords
me privileged insights into the unfolding of Gorongosa
Park’s relationship with mountain residents from the time
of Greg Carr’s initial involvement, I also recognise that my
perspective is more richly informed by research conducted on
Gorongosa Mountain than it is by deep, long-term ethnographic
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engagement with members of the park’s leadership based
primarily in the Chitengo camp inside the park. However,
I was in contact with members of the Carr Foundation and
the park leadership beginning in 2005 and maintained this
communication throughout the course of this research.
Although my research focused on the lives of mountain
residents, it is my hope that I am able to highlight aspects of
both park-based actors’ and mountain residents’ narratives
about the expansion of the park to Gorongosa Mountain that
offer greater understandings of both sides of the conflict.
ARGUMENT
A magic bullet for a crisis: a saviour and a gardener of
Eden
The most widely circulating narrative about GNP is a familiar
win-win conservation and development success story that has
gained popular media attention. From the very start, The Carr
Foundation’s involvement in GNP has attracted a great deal of
media attention. Greg Carr’s success in business, his subsequent
status as a millionaire, and his philanthropic ventures have
served to raise his public prominence and to strengthen the
authoritative quality of his efforts. His venture into conservation
has tapped into the magic combination of celebrity and
environment, allowing him to be counted among a group of
people Brockington has termed ‘celebrity conservationists,’
whose active commitment to environmental causes greatly
increases their fame and public profile (2009). The narrative
of Carr’s philanthropic venture has been featured in widely
circulated glossies such as National Geographic Explorer,
Forbes, The New Yorker and Outside Magazine. With titles
such as ‘Gardener of Eden,’ ‘Greg Carr’s Big Gamble,’ ‘The
Saviour of Gorongosa,’ and ‘Saving a Global Treasure,’ these
features uniformly present Greg Carr as a heroic protagonist,
turning Carr into a rock star of conservation philanthropy.5
A segment titled ‘One Man’s Plan to Save a Natural Treasure’
that appeared on the popular CBS6 show, ‘60 Minutes’ on
October 26, 2008 is representative of this dominant narrative.
In this segment, the focal point of the story is Carr’s generosity
to use USD 40 million over a period of 20 years to bring about
dramatic improvements in both conservation and human
development in Gorongosa. The segment in the show opens
with the following statement:
How much can one man do to save a desperate
nation? American entrepreneur Greg Carr is finding
out, throwing himself and much of his fortune into
one of the poorest places on earth. Mozambique, in
East Africa, is a country of spectacular beauty, but
it’s been laid waste by decades of war, by malaria
and by HIV. It takes a lot of vision to see opportunity
there, but… Carr thinks he’s found it, in a wildlife
park called Gorongosa, which he believes could be
the salvation of a nation, and maybe a model for the
world.7

The ‘60 Minutes’ narrative portrays Gorongosa as “a tragedy
in two parts”: the fall of a national park to obscurity from a
position as the “most popular national park in all of Africa”
after extensive wildlife loss from war-time poaching; and “the
suffering of its people whose lives haven’t improved much in
a few hundred years.”8 With this seemingly hopeless situation
as the frame, Greg Carr is figured as a hero whose innovative
plan to bring “entrepreneurship to charity” promises to “bring
Gorongosa back to what it was.”9 In an interview filmed in the
park’s Chitengo Camp, Greg Carr states:
So, the idea is take the beauty of the park and use
that to do human development. Attract the tourists
who will spend the money to create the jobs and lift
everybody outta poverty. For an entrepreneur, it’s
kind of a compelling opportunity to, you know, one
plus one equals ten.10
Scott Pelley narrates the segment as he takes a tour of GNP
and Vinho, a settlement adjacent to the park’s headquarters,
which has been the location of most of the Carr Foundation’s
direct human development initiatives. On this tour, Greg
Carr figures prominently as he guides Pelley—with minor
parts played by two park employees—the then Park Director
Baldeu Chande, and the then Director of Community Relations,
Mateus Mutemba. These people, none of whom are long-term
residents of Gorongosa, figure as the protagonists in the
narrative—actors who implement benevolent projects in the
park and in the neighbouring settlement. Their viewpoints
from interviews are woven together to contribute to the main
plot line.
By contrast, in this portrayal, Gorongosa residents are
not active protagonists but are represented as an audience
to the unfolding events and the raw material for directed
interventions. Footage depicts several shots of malnourished
children as Scott Pelley cites striking statistics to illustrate the
severity of poverty in Mozambique. Scenes from Vinho feature
residents making use of facilities built with Carr Foundation
funds: students in assembly at the new USD 100,000 school;
people waiting in line at the new USD 200,000 health clinic;
and scenes of a community gathering where the narrator notes
that, “among the villagers Carr is treated like a rock star.”11
This narrative presents the Carr Foundation’s efforts in a single
population centre adjacent to the park as emblematic of how
the project impacts all residents living in and around the park’s
territory of 4,067 sq. km and a buffer zone of 3,300 sq. km. It
thus uniformly depicts Gorongosa residents as the silent and
grateful recipients of Carr’s goodwill.
Like this ‘60 Minutes’ feature, the dominant popular
narrative of Greg Carr’s involvement in GNP gains widespread
circulation through the work of the park’s public relations staff.
The park’s PR Department actively transmits this narrative
through press releases and a sophisticated website to lure
both potential donors and prospective visitors. Once visitors
arrive at the park, this narrative is also transmitted in new
ways to shape visitors’ experiences. Hospitality staff actively

144 / Schuetze
emphasise the ‘beginning’ point of the narrative for park
visitors by setting up a television in the main restaurant that
screens vintage videos of the colonial heyday when vast herds
of water buffalo, zebra, and antelope of all sorts gathered at
Lake Urema during the dry season.
Having depicted the colonial past as a glorious one, the
dominant GNP narrative then highlights a present situation
of crisis (the combined challenges of depleted wildlife
and the poverty of area residents), and the imagined future
restoration of the park’s former glory through the salvation of
a “restoration project” which will both rejuvenate tourism and
serve as an “engine of economic growth for the entire region.”12
This narrative has wide appeal because of the apparent
plausibility of a simple solution, the absence of conflict, and
its heart-warming content.
In these popular stories, crisis functions to garner praise
and support for a worthy and benevolent cause and creates a
sense of ‘history in the making’—a crucial moment in time
which prompts potential visitors to desire to see the progress
first hand. Conflict and complicated realities are edited out of
this popular version of the story—allowing it to retain its wide
appeal. But, such popular narratives that figure Carr as a hero
bringing uniformly positive benefits to eager recipients belie
a much more complicated situation on the ground.
Where is the ‘crisis’?: the persuasive power of narratives
of environmental degradation
The ‘60 Minutes’ segment and other features on the GRP
offer an abbreviated view into what has been a much more
expansive effort to rehabilitate GNP. From the very start, a
significant focus of the Carr Foundation’s involvement in GNP
has been to extend the boundaries of the park to include the
upper elevations of Gorongosa Mountain. In this context, the
dominant narrative is a powerful depiction of an environmental
crisis that was circulated to generate financial support and
public approval for the park’s expansion. Examining this
narrative in greater detail reveals the deeply persuasive power
of crisis narratives in conservation and development projects.
After an aerial tour of GNP that also included Gorongosa
Mountain in September 2005, Greg Carr and American
ecologist Rich Beilfuss became alarmed at fires and deforested
areas on the mountain’s slopes. After this helicopter tour, Carr
concluded urgently, “colleagues of mine who are scientists
believe that the mountain top will be mostly destroyed in a
very few years if something is not done.”13 Thus, in one brief
sentence, a narrative was put forward, legitimated by the
authoritative knowledge of ‘scientists,’ and creating a sense of
urgency for something ‘to be done.’ Two days later Beilfuss,
the then head of the Carr Foundation’s new Gorongosa Park
Research Station,14 stated that their “strategy to deal with
the problem” would “involve efforts to entice people off
the mountain with some sort of settled, irrigated household
schemes in the lowlands below 2,000 feet.”15
The contours of this narrative quickly gained more detail,
more solid grounding in authoritative knowledge, and clearer

definition for paths of action to take. Beilfuss and other
Carr Foundation staff soon undertook “preliminary studies”
including six helicopter transects, a “nine-day ground visit
with residents and land users on the mountain,” and “analysis
of change using satellite imagery” (Beilfuss et al. 2005: 2).
A report of findings from this rapid assessment was released
in December 2005, and declared that the mountain was
“under immediate threat” (Beilfuss et al. 2005: 1) and that
“slash-and-burn encroachment and uncontrolled fire escaping
from hunting or clearing, are the two main destructive forces
behind the loss of the forest ecosystem” (Beilfuss et al.
2005: 5). Less than four months from the initial observations,
the authors presented their findings, arguing that, “the rate
and extent of land clearing on the Gorongosa Mountain is
accelerating rapidly” and that “it will take no more than three
to five years before the ecosystem is degraded to a point from
which it is unlikely to recover” (Carr Foundation 2006: 10).
At this time, the Carr Foundation funded the production and
circulation of a sophisticated video titled ‘Save the Mountain’
in order to generate awareness of and support for their efforts.
After receiving the reports myself, I was anxious to return
and see the situation first hand. Having lived on the upper
elevations of the mountain in 2004, I was concerned about
what sounded like an alarming situation for people I knew
personally. Given the inflammatory language of the Carr
Foundation’s 2005 ‘Save the Mountain’ public campaign,
when I returned to stay on the Khanda portion of the mountain
in 2006, I expected to now be able to see in person what the
video and reports described as ‘denuded hillsides’ above my
host family’s fields. But as I gazed up at the top of the mountain
that loomed over my host family’s home, the dark edge of
the montane rainforest looked just as it had two years before.
There was no sign of crisis, no visible clear cuts, and no barren
hillsides as Greg Carr’s emails had led me to imagine. The
fields here were just as they had been since I began visiting
the area in 1999.
The surprise I felt on my return resulted from one of the
effects of prevalent and globally circulating environmental
crisis narratives. Though I knew of residents’ complex
agricultural, fire control, and land management systems
from previous stays on the mountain, the characterisation
of crisis in authoritative technical language and through
high quality media appealed to powerful universal ideas
(Tsing 2005)—ideas so potent that I was led to expect that
the situation on the mountain had made a sudden change for
the worse. The Carr Foundation’s reports of the situation in
Gorongosa had overwhelmed my own grounded knowledge
of the people and place of Gorongosa that came from more
than three years of living in the district.
Part of the power of environmental crisis narratives comes
from their tendency to simplify complex situations into
familiar and recognizable stories. Examining the emergence
of the park’s crisis narrative of ecological collapse on the
mountain illustrates this aspect well. When Greg Carr and other
members of his foundation’s team first made aerial visits to the
mountain in 2005, they incorporated their observations into
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pre-existing narrative frameworks, linking brief observations
into a complete vision of the nature of the situation. As has
been noted elsewhere in Africa regarding the creation of land
and resource policy, Carr and his team of scientists inferred
sweeping crisis from casual ‘snapshot’ observations (Fairhead
and Leach 1996). Aerial views that were literally detached
from both social context and time depth perspective became
the basis for formulating a vision of the scale and speed
of deforestation despite weak empirical evidence.16 Carr
Foundation scientists’ readings of the Gorongosa Mountain
landscape are likely to have been further skewed since they
made their primary observations during the end of the dry
season (September-October) when many people set fires as
part of the regular agricultural cycle and to create fire breaks
around homesteads surrounded by dense, tall grasses. As
Leach and Mearns have noted, a common methodological
error in scientific assessments of environmental degradation in
Africa has been “to take short-run observations as evidence of
a secular long-run trend, when they may simply describe one
phase in a cycle” (Leach and Mearns 1996: 15).
This example also reveals another key aspect of the power
of crisis narratives in this context—their influence on how
one interprets evidence and experience. The fact that such a
rapid assessment led so quickly to definitive explanations and
prescriptions for action, including ideas for massive ‘voluntary’
resettlement schemes for mountain residents, reveals how,
beginning in 2005, Carr Foundation staff made sense of
the situation in Gorongosa drawing on wider discourses or
what Leach and Mearns refer to as “received wisdom about
environmental change” (Leach and Mearns 1996: 3). Indeed,
Carr Foundation scientists’ narrative of crisis depends on and
perpetuates a conventional view, that African agriculturalists
are “incapable of acting as resource custodians” (Leach and
Mearns 1996: 20). The choice of the pejorative language of
‘slash-and-burn’ to describe observed fires and cleared forest
patches also reveals an implicit value judgement of mountain
residents’ land use as irrational (Guha 1997), which gains
even more explicit expression when early Carr Foundation
reports described fire and farming techniques as ‘destructive
forces.’ Linking into prevalent conservation and development
narratives, assumptions about the nature and speed of
ecological change on the mountain seemed solid and legitimate
enough to serve as the basis to propose policies as drastic as
‘enticing’ people to move off of their land.
Perhaps most significantly, the extreme degree of urgency
that characterises this narrative of crisis reveals more
about the interests of Carr Foundation leaders than it does
about the nature of deforestation on the mountain. Emery Roe’s
observation about the links between crisis narratives and claims
to land and resources applies directly here:
Crisis narratives are the primary means whereby
development experts and the institutions for
which they work claim rights to stewardship
over land and resources they do not own. By
generating and appealing to crisis narratives,
technical experts and managers assert rights as

‘stakeholders’ in the land and resources they say are
under crisis. (Roe 1995: 1066)
New on the scene in Gorongosa in 2005, the Carr Foundation
team had numerous interests at stake in highlighting the
situation on Gorongosa Mountain as a crisis. Not only did the
mountain offer an additional area for intervention that made
the nascent project seem more important and necessary, but it
also presented the possibility of enhancing the park’s attraction
for tourists. A park without much wildlife would need special
attractions to draw tourists far from the beaten path of eastern
and southern African safari travel. In fact, the December 2005
report on Gorongosa Mountain includes “loss of tourism
potential” along with “degradation of forest cover” and
“degradation of water supply” in a list of the “main threats to
the mountain system” (Beilfuss et al. 2005: 7-8). Accordingly,
the Carr Foundation began promotions and preparations for
tourist visits to the mountain as early as 2006, even before they
gained official permission from the area’s residents (Figure 1).
My experiences living on the southwest side of Gorongosa
Mountain from 2006-2008 revealed a situation, which, (while
not a utopia), was much more stable and much less dire
than the Carr Foundation’s portrayal of crisis. Over time,
even representations of the ‘crisis’ on the park’s website

Figure 1
A tourist map from 2006 showing (blue dot) the Murombodzi waterfall
(Cascata Murombodzi) on the southwestern side of the Gorongosa
Mountain as an attraction
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have required modification. When I left the area in 2008,
around the time that the Carr Foundation had predicted the
ecosystem on the mountain would have “degraded to a point
from which it is unlikely to recover” (Carr Foundation 2006:
10), little had changed in the forest on Khanda’s portion of
the mountain. In 2009, the Gorongosa website altered the
timeline to place the end point of disaster at 2011. Now, the
ominous time-oriented predictions of immanent collapse are
absent from the website, but a tone of urgent crisis remains.17
Environmental crisis on Gorongosa Mountain, from the
GNP perspective, has become a protracted condition. The
persuasive power of environmental crisis narratives is here
visible: despite the inaccuracies of assessments of the timeline
for ecosystem collapse on the mountain, the determination
of the situation as one requiring outside intervention remains
unchanged and unquestioned.
A different kind of crisis: narratives of threats to land
tenure on the mountain
While the Carr Foundation made much of the ‘crisis’ of
deforestation on Mount Gorongosa, most of its residents
generated a narrative of an ominous predicament of a much
different sort. This sense of present crisis struck me as
overwhelming when I first returned to stay with my host family
on Gorongosa Mountain in 2006. My first excited conversations
with old friends were strikingly different than on my previous
return visits. Those who knew me well told me their latest
news, as was always the case. But rather than telling me about
a child who was ill, the latest new-born, or the results of this
year’s harvest, people pulled me aside to tell me with urgent
concern that ‘Fundação Carr’18 had come and was trying to take
their land away. Residents of all stripes shared this sentiment:
women, men, youth, elders, church leaders, and traditional
leaders alike. This atmosphere revealed another aspect of crisis
narratives. Situations deemed to be urgent or pressing move
to the forefront as a primary concern, superseding all others.
Just as demonstrated by the Carr Foundation’s ‘Save the
Mountain’ public campaign, crisis narratives evoke a desire for
transmission—a desire that was also apparent when I visited
Khanda’s régulo,19 Eugénio Almeida, shortly after my arrival. He
too expressed an urgent sense of crisis. He spoke in a hushed tone
about the Carr Foundation and then asked me if I had brought
my voice recorder. Revealing a strong desire to transmit this
narrative of crisis and his awareness of having limited access to
channels for its spread, he said, “Turn it on… this is important.”
The régulo picked up a stick and began drawing a map of
Gorongosa district at our feet. Pointing to the oval representing
the mountain and tracing it all the way to the edge of the
Pungue River he said, “From here all the way to there—all of
this belonged to the régulos. Each régulo had their population.
And when the Portuguese came, people were living here.” He
pointed to the area inside the present borders of the park, saying:
When they arrived, they encountered animals of all
kinds. And they expelled the people… That area they

call ‘park’—there in the park they threw out Régulo
Chikale, Régulo Nyanguwo, Régulo Tambarara: ‘Get
out! Get out!’20
The park’s history depicted in this narrative stands in stark
contrast to the popular media’s narrative, which begins with the
park’s ‘glorious past’. In the regulo’s narrative vision, restoring
the colonial past of the park is not a positive goal. While the
park was once splendid for wealthy leisure tourists, it was not
so for Gorongosa’s residents. The human costs involved in the
park’s creation were extremely high. Elder Gorongosans recall
how colonial agents used the brutal system of taxation and
conscripted labour to force the very residents who had been
displaced from the present-day park to return to their former
territory to build roads and lodging for tourists. Thus, to many
long-term Gorongosa residents, the project to rehabilitate the
park is re-creating, repeating and extending the negative legacy
of the park into the present.
The Régulo paused, looked up from the map he had been
drawing, and looked me right in the eyes. Lowering his gaze,
he slowly moved the stick to point again at his map and said:
Now this here is Gorongosa Mountain. [T he
Portuguese] weren’t able to claim it—they weren’t
able to claim the area all the way to here. But now, our
government, because they are poor, now they want to
put this mountain in, for all this to be included with
Chitengo.21 But we don’t want this! We don’t want
it! We don’t want it, we don’t want it, we don’t want
it.22
On the mountain, where nearly all residents make their
living from small-scale farming, land is central to political,
economic, and social life. Political power and rights over land
and resources are all linked to ancestral tenure—those who
can claim to be descendants of the first settlers on Gorongosa
Mountain are considered the present owners of the land
(Isaacman 1972; Shipton 1994). Thus, mountain residents’
dominant narrative is centred around the view of long-term
tenure and autochthony as the legitimate basis for claims to
land and resources.
This ancestral claim is embodied in the explicitly political
figure of mhondoro spirits. Mhondoro—the spirits of the first
political leaders to rule in the area—reside on the mountaintop,
and exert ongoing political authority through well known
regulations and prohibitions. In Gorongosa, mhondoro are
seen as the owners of the land who, when well respected, look
after the well-being and prosperity of their descendants (Lan
1985; Shoko 2007). Mhondoro, and other spirits residing in
an area must be accorded due respect, or they may show their
disapproval by causing misfortune. Mountain residents recall
historical moments, stretching back to pre-colonial times, when
mhondoro spirits have intervened in times of crisis to protect
mountain residents from outside threats.
To the residents of Gorongosa Mountain, the arrival of Greg
Carr’s heavily financed project to rehabilitate GNP raised the
familiar spectre of the possibility of dispossession and thereby
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also the anger of mhondoro spirits. The unified sense of urgency
that emerged among long-term residents of the mountain
derives from both recent and deep historical experience with
struggles over the most important shared source of and political
and economic security—land. For over a century, Gorongosa
Mountain has been a site of struggle. The mountain has been a
place of refuge and a stronghold for groups opposing various
forms of centralised outside governments23 (French 2009;
Schuetze 2010). In the late colonial period, the Portuguese
government granted a large portion of land on the Khanda
side of the mountain to a German man to start a dairy farm.
An enormous swath of land high on the mountain was turned
to pasture for his cattle. Many of those displaced later worked
on the dairy farm, but this employment and the ‘economic
benefits’ did not compensate for the loss of land and led to
deep-seated anger.
Following independence, displaced residents were able to
return to their land, but the war between Frelimo and Renamo24
soon brought land tenure to the centre of a new struggle. During
the 16 year conflict, mountain residents were the focal point in a
struggle over control of the population. Because Renamo troops
had a base on the mountain and relied on residents to supply them
with labour and basic foodstuffs, Frelimo strategy aimed to cut
off this important support base by forcing residents into aldeias
or ‘communal villages’ in the lowlands. Mountain residents
were targeted in a scorched earth campaign where homes, fields
and granaries were burnt, and goats and chickens slaughtered,
in order to leave them with no choice but to seek refuge and
food aid in the Frelimo protectorates. But, for many mountain
residents, remaining on their own land was so important that
they preferred to find a way to eke out a living on wild foods and
by planting crops in hidden valleys, risking punishment from
Frelimo or capture by Renamo troops who periodically raided
homesteads to conscript people into the army.
These past threats to land tenure coalesced into a powerful,
shared narrative that fostered defiant attitudes against the Carr
Foundation that were so widely shared as to be almost universal
among mountain residents. This narrative, also informed by
previous experiences with GNP, painted a homogenous picture
of anyone assumed to be Carr Foundation staff as villainous
outsiders with only nefarious intentions and a singular desire
to force residents off their land. Colouring mountain residents’
interpretations of the Carr Foundation’s planned interventions,
this narrative thus ignited resistance to park initiatives as soon
as they were first introduced.
Community meetings: narratives like oil and water
Unified and intense opposition to the Carr Foundation’s
early initiatives on Gorongosa Mountain began even before
programmed interventions were put in place. The Carr
Foundation began its project on the mountain by convening
several ‘community meetings’ held in the Khanda Regulado
on the southwest slope of Gorongosa Mountain. Such meetings
were a critical aspect of what the Carr Foundation heralded
as “the full involvement of the communities in all aspects

and stages of development” of interventions on the mountain
(Beilfuss et al. 2005: 8). Following legal guidelines in the
national land law, some of these meetings were also required
in order to obtain the approval of the area’s residents for
proposed land use. In the context of these meetings, the two
crisis narratives came into conflict, but, like oil and water, they
repelled each other and remained separate.
At the first ‘community meeting,’ held on January 13, 2006,
Greg Carr and other leaders of the Carr Foundation, with
district government representatives and the then Director of
GNP, Roberto Zolho, met with a crowd of residents of the
Khanda region of the mountain. The meeting focused on a
proposal to form a ‘partnership’ with the park to manage the
land at the top of the mountain. In their speeches, park and
government leaders shared precious few details about what
such a partnership would entail. District government officials
explained that the Carr Foundation had generously offered
to manage the land on the mountain. Park representatives
characterised the Carr Foundation’s interests as: the
“exploration of Gorongosa Mountain” for a “joint-venture
in ecotourism” (GTZ, PRODER 2006). They explained that
tourists would contribute money to the Khanda community so
their lives would improve.
After this brief presentation, attendees responded by expressing
their concerns. The official meeting report summarised mountain
residents’ statements in the following way:
…all were unanimous in affirming that they had no
intention of forming a partnership [with the park]
because… they had already had negative experiences
in the past or during the colonial period, when
many Portuguese settled in an area and then shortly
thereafter began to impede and expulse people…
(GTZ, PRODER 2006).
Mountain residents’ narratives, grounded in historical
experience, shaped powerful resistance to the idea of park
management of the land and resources, and quickly fomented
a sense of unity in opposition to an outside threat. The Carr
Foundation’s narrative and vision for intervention on the
mountain, which made great sense from a social and physical
distance, thus encountered an obstacle when placed before
area residents for approval.
Rather than withdraw or work towards a modified,
collaborative arrangement, project leaders concluded that
the problem lay in local residents’ ‘misplaced’ fear of land
loss and ignorance of the goals and values of conservation.
The goal for Carr Foundation leaders then became to
bring mountain residents’ understanding of the situation
and goals for intervention into conformity with that of
project leaders. A note appearing at the end of the official
report of this initial meeting reads: “A weak capacity to
understand complex issues such as this is common in the
communities” (GTZ, PRODER 2006).25 And, in a bullet list of
recommendations it was suggested that park staff “study other
ways to present the issue in order to generate more interest
in the community”(GTZ, PRODER 2006). Revealing how,
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‘full involvement of communities’ in the project, in practice,
referred merely to a process of consultations to gain approval
for inflexible and predetermined schemes, the report made
no recommendations to modify or drop the original proposal.
Rather, a second meeting was called, one month after the first.
During this second meeting, park representatives again made
general speeches about their proposal but added no details.
Khanda residents again responded with impassioned speeches
of refusal. Seeing that their answer had been ignored twice in a
row, all the attendees stood up and walked out in protest before
the meeting ended. This display of unity and defiance in the face
of authority illustrates an effect of mountain residents’ crisis
narrative. Building on habits ingrained from generations of
living under colonial rule, rural residents of Gorongosa typically
display a supremely diplomatic and almost submissive stance
in formal meetings with authority figures.
This surprisingly showy and unified protest was animated
by narratives that figured the Carr Foundation as foreign
interlopers bent on taking land on the mountain, leading the
meeting attendees to collectively abandon social conventions of
deference in order to demonstrate their unified resistance. As one
man put it: “we have known for a long time what it’s like to have
our land taken from us. First, they speak sweet words… they
will act like our friends today, but tomorrow, they will kick us
to the side.”26 In meetings held in Khanda from 2006-2008, the
narrative fortresses on either side were not breached, but rather,
the persuasive qualities of crisis narratives shaped interpretations
of and hardened responses to the other side’s words and actions,
making positions quite rigid, further illustrating the power of
divergent narratives of crisis to shape and maintain conflict.
Mhondoro narratives, unity, and resistance
Despite the opposition they encountered in these meetings,
the Carr Foundation pushed forward with its agenda to extend
conservation and tourism activities to the mountain. In response,
mountain residents continued to present a unified front of
resistance. In the eyes of mountain residents, from 2006 to 2008,
the Carr Foundation’s actions were characterised by empty
promises and disrespect. Slotting them into a single character
position in their narrative, residents of Khanda saw Carr
Foundation employees and associates as a homogeneous group,
and felt that they were treating the mountain as their own. Despite
their overt refusal to approve the park’s proposal to initiate
conservation efforts on the mountain, residents watched as Carr
Foundation employees moved forward with conservation and
tourism schemes on their terms, ignoring traditional regulations
governing access to sacred areas. Some park projects, such as
the actual and planned construction of buildings and structures
to serve tourists violate specific rules ordained by the mhondoro
including strong prohibitions against placing buildings above
certain elevations. These actions intensified residents’ sense of
the threat to their land and fomented a powerful sense of unity
and defiance that would build over time.
In 2007, the Carr Foundation hired a team of dozens of
fiscais (fiscais=rangers) to patrol the mountainside in Khanda.

These fiscais visited fields above 700m, imposing fines for
cutting certain tree species and pressuring residents to plant
tree seedlings in fields on steep slopes, immediately adjacent
to streams, or in areas otherwise deemed to be ‘unsustainable.’
Mountain residents regarded the deployment of forestry rangers
as a major affront and responded with outspoken resistance,
leading to overt conflicts with residents of the lowlands who
were employed as fiscais. As one man explained: “four fiscais
came and wanted to plant trees in our garden. We refused, [and
said to them] that if you want to plant [the trees] why don’t
you plant them in your field?… If you want to plant them,
go ahead, but as soon as you leave, we will pull them out.”27
Mountain residents also watched as park staff buzzed around
the mountainside in helicopters to travel to meetings, take
important guests for aerial tours, or shuttle biologists back and
forth between the mountaintop and their accommodations in
the park. For many, the frequent roar of helicopters stirred up
the terror of the recent war when Frelimo made aerial attacks
on home sites in a last-ditch effort to remove any families
who remained in hiding (Schuetze 2010). These events thus
reinforced mountain residents’ crisis narrative, grounding the
narrative’s early predictions in tangible signs that their land
was under immediate threat.
The Carr Foundation’s offences touched off a flurry of stories
of the protective actions of Mhondoro spirits—narratives
that further strengthened mountain residents’ sense of unity
and righteousness of autochthonous land claims. In the face
of the Carr Foundation’s offences, one story spread like
wildfire as proof that these spirits continue to have force. In
late 2006, the Carr Foundation hired a ‘community liaison’
to manage relationships with mountain residents in Khanda.
While visiting different mfumos (mfumos=subchiefs) near
Nyankhukhu, this young British man set his sights on an
impressively tall dome-shaped granite outcrop known as Bango
Moliro, which, in Chigorongosi translates as ‘fire mountain.’
Seeing the landmark as an exciting place to bring tourists, he
ignored the explicit warnings of the mfumos against visiting
this prohibited area and climbed up to explore. Soon after,
while driving back to the park in one of the Carr Foundation’s
new 4x4 vehicles, he noticed smoke flowing out from under
the hood and stopped to investigate. Before long, the car was
consumed in flames and was destroyed completely.
How a brand new truck with no previous engine problems
could catch fire baffled park staff, but made complete sense
to mountain residents, who spread the story with glee. After
all, the young man had climbed Fire Mountain in defiance of
the mhondoro’s prohibitions. Offended spirits were actively
at work.
This and other stories depicting the protective and retributive
actions of mhondoro reveal the power of narrative to foster
unity and defiance and a sense of moral righteousness. They
also illustrate how Gorongosa Mountain residents’ sense of
patrimony is much more strongly based on their land and
ancestral political claims than with the nation or the national
government of Mozambique. It was not long before it became
clear to mountain residents that the national government
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was in support of the Carr Foundation’s project, and many
were not surprised. As one leader put it: “I’ve told you that
the government wants money. They’ve been bought. Now, we,
the people, are familiar with how our government works. The
people here have no power.”28
In stark contrast to Mozambique’s central government,
narratives figured mhondoro spirits as responsive and active in
protecting mountain residents’ land tenure. Resistance to the
park’s interventions on the mountain, then, also gave expression
to resistance to the authority and legitimacy of the national
government. The park’s expansion to Gorongosa Mountain was
therefore deeply political, rekindling long-standing opposition to
external centres of political power. The park’s project reaffirmed
mountain residents’ assessment of the national government as
an illegitimate power which acts not to protect the interests of
the people but only to generate wealth for a limited few.
Producing destruction: narrative fortresses
When I returned to Gorongosa Mountain in June and July
2011, I was officially entering a national park. While no signs
indicating this park status had been posted, the park designation
had a heavy impact on the area. What struck me most was the
way in which communication between park leadership and
mountain residents was so infrequent as to be nearly absent.
Early aspirations for ‘full involvement’ of resident populations
in the implementation of the project had been completely
abandoned. Instead there was even tighter fortification of
information and thicker barriers to affected residents’ real
involvement in park planning or decision-making. Thus,
narrative fortresses became more apparent, and more
impermeable to change or influence.
Throughout the early years of the project, rumours about
park officials’ plan and actions in regards to the mountain
circulated widely. Excluded from the planning table and
barred from influencing the design and vision of the project’s
initiatives from the start, mountain residents were left to fear
the worst about the intentions of outsiders. Information shared
at ‘community meetings’ had been overly vague and general,
fostering fearful speculation about the park’s actual plans. This
situation has not changed over time. Tellingly, I learned of the
official inclusion of the upper elevations of the mountain in the
park via an internet news article from my home in the US in
the summer of 2010, long before the news reached mountain
residents. It wasn’t until March 2011 that park authorities
convened an official ‘community meeting’ in Khanda to make
the announcement.
By the time I arrived in June 2011 it seemed that
communication problems had worsened. Or at least the stakes
were now higher. Upon my return to stay with my host family
I was shocked to find that everyone seemed to be talking about
immanent dispossession. And, I watched exchanges where
residents living inside the new park boundaries received clear
information from people in official positions that they should
prepare to move their homesteads to the lowlands. These
reports came from sources including the District Director

of Education, the Governor of Sofala Province, and fiscais
employed by the GRP.
When I shared this information with leaders of the park’s new
division set up to manage the mountain, they were dismayed
and explained that there were no such plans in the works. The
park project leaders’ failure to involve mountain residents
in planning and design and, at a minimum, their failure to
open clear lines of communication about the implications
of the park designation, opened the way for narratives of
impending dispossession to dominate. Such dramatic failures to
communicate have had negative effects for all parties. Fearing
immanent dispossession, mountain residents were altering
plans for the immediate future, including questioning whether
to invest in the upkeep of their property. Here, a tragic impact
of these narrative fortresses is revealed. Without means for
effective communication, park actors and mountain residents
came to live in separate realities—with harmful consequences
for mountain residents whose actions in the present and plans
for the future were shaped by the rising fears of forced removal.
Most disturbingly, the animosity and fear of the situation
contributed to a visible increase in deforested areas—exactly
what the park project on the mountain aimed to halt. My return
visit allowed me to witness how a ‘crisis’ of deforestation
had become more palpable. In early July, I hiked around the
mountain summit and saw large areas cleared for fields—areas
that had been solid forest during my last visit in 2008. In
interviews with numerous residents, I found everyone I talked
to was well aware of the situation. Most mountain residents
I interviewed expressed deep dismay about the people who
were suddenly clearing fields on the mountain’s summit. The
mountain’s summit has long been understood to be territory
off limits to cultivation—an area where mhondoro and other
land spirits reside. Spiritually mandated prohibitions against
cutting trees on the summit were still strictly adhered to while
I lived on the mountain from 2006 to 2008.
While I encountered different interpretations of the reasons
for the transgressions, all of them were linked to a profound
sense of powerlessness, anger, and immanent crisis. Some
attributed these people’s actions to last-ditch efforts to
accumulate money from potato farming to buffer the material
devastation that would accompany removal to the lowlands.
Others explained that transgressions were based in a sense that
if the forests were the focus of outsiders’ interest in controlling
the land, destroying forests might drive them away. Others
saw it as sabotage—as a form of retribution where destroying
forest was aimed explicitly against the park’s clear interest in
protecting the forests—to frustrate park actors and make them
also feel a sense of powerlessness. As one man put it, all this
started when the park came to claim control of the land: “it’s
almost a competition. If you want to see [deforestation], then
that’s what we’ll do.”29
CONCLUSION
Between 2006 and 2008, the Carr Foundation’s initiatives
on Gorongosa Mountain touched off a conflict that led to
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a hardening of positions—the development of narrative
fortresses—rather than creating any sort of genuinely
collaborative efforts with area residents. As the community
meetings and their aftermath illustrate, crisis narratives played
a powerful role in the creation and perpetuation of this conflict.
These narratives shaped different actors’ sense of legitimacy
and purpose, their interpretation of events, and their actions,
thereby serving as “a medium through which events [were]
produced” (Fortmann 1995: 1054). Fundamentally different
apprehensions of crisis in narratives about threats to the
land and resources on Gorongosa Mountain and a failure
to breach them with respectful communication or genuine
collaboration has had negative effects on the well-being of
residents. Locked in rigid fortresses, these divergent narratives
of crisis intensified over time, leading actors on both sides to
transgress moral and legal norms. By 2011, the deepening
and intensifying conflict with GNP had catalysed dramatic
transgressions of long-held prohibitions that give expression to
a local conservation ethic. Crisis narratives lent actors who felt
otherwise powerless a sense of righteousness in these actions.
Thus, the project’s environmental crisis narratives ironically
produced outcomes counter to the goals of conservationists.
Expanding beyond a focus on narratives to examine the
centrality of contrasting evaluations of ‘crisis’ offers several
important insights. First, it reveals the deeply persuasive
power of environmental crisis claims in conservation and
development projects. Linking into broader circulating
narratives, these claims quickly generate authority and
legitimacy for rapid action despite obstacles or opposition.
Narrating particular contexts in terms of environmental crisis
creates the sense of necessity for intervention. Crisis-claims
about threatened ecosystems motivate desires for urgent
action and, drawing on a growing sense of global patrimony
of biodiversity, they legitimate the authority for external
intervention. Further, as Roitman notes, “crisis is posited as
an a priori; the grounds for knowledge of crisis are neither
questioned nor made explicit” (2013: 10). Environmental
crisis narratives thus have a powerful and persuasive effect
on a broader public—tapping into the power of already
existing narratives of global environmental crisis, such
narrative portrayals of particular contexts can lend any
proposed interventions legitimacy without the need for
extensive empirical evidence to substantiate claims. In the
case of the Carr Foundation’s early efforts to extend park
activities and governance to Gorongosa Mountain, narratives
of environmental crisis were created in the space of a few
months, gaining expansive ‘communicability’ (Briggs 2005)
through the authoritative language of ecological science.
Examining the nature and effects of crisis narratives in this
case also helps to shed light on why the Carr Foundation’s
initial aspirations to foster amicable relations and create
plans for the project with the ‘full involvement’ of resident
populations were quickly replaced by a top-down governing
structure. This initial aspiration for partnership with Gorongosa
residents was shaped by a larger set of structures, including
Mozambique’s current neoliberal economic development

strategies that encourage tourism ventures. Ecotourism is
bolstered by narratives of ‘neoliberal conservation’ (Büscher
and Whande 2007), which offer the satisfying illusion of
parks as progressive forces–as correcting mistakes of harsh
fortress conservation practices of the past. In Mozambique,
this vision for parks is clearly expressed by Mozambique’s
Ministry of Tourism which states its goal is to move beyond
“past” practices when conservation areas were “planned
and managed against people” towards a “future” when
conservation areas will be “run with, for, and in some cases by
local people” (MITUR 2004: 19). The centrality of tourism to
neoliberal conservation strategies shapes the kinds of win-win
conservation and development success story narratives
that GNP generates. Heart warming, progressive narratives
proliferate in order to draw socially conscious visitors, who
are driven by a neoliberal logic of “consumptive activity” as
environmental action (Igoe et al. 2010: 504).
With such powerful forces promoting partnership
relationships and joint management of protected areas with
resident populations, what led Carr Foundation staff to so
quickly abandon this goal? The sense of urgency, conviction,
and righteousness that crisis evokes showed itself to be much
more powerful than visions of undoing past wrongs and
running conservation areas “with, for, and in some cases by
local people” (MITUR 2004). By their very nature, crisis
claims are judgements of a situation that lend themselves to
rigid, fixed positions. As Roitman (2013: 3) has revealed,
“crisis is mobilised in narrative constructions to mark
out...moments of truth,” bolstering a sense of authoritative
knowledge of the state of a problem and the direction needed
for change. For the early staff of the Carr Foundation, facing
what was deemed a crisis situation, there appeared to be no
time or space for compromise. Thus, ‘community meetings’ on
Gorongosa Mountain almost immediately became information
sessions with no room for negotiation or joint decision making.
Plans set before mountain residents for approval were carried
out despite vocal opposition to them. Mountain residents’
refusal to grant the park permission for land use was subverted
by taking the request to the national government, which issued
a decree that officially annexed the higher elevations of the
mountain to the existing park.
Meanwhile, relationships between park actors, government
representatives, and residents of affected areas of the mountain
deteriorated, communication channels became confused and
broken, and fears of mountain residents became heightened—
opening the way for retaliatory acts. Thus, the sense of crisis—
both for conservationists and for mountain residents alike
intensified. This situation fuelled a spiral of conflict that later
threatened to move toward violent outcomes, as beginning in
2011, park staff responsible for management of the mountain
began contemplating the potential for employing armed guards
to protect the forests.30
The early phase of the Carr Foundation’s efforts in
Gorongosa reveals the dangers of conservation schemes in
a context of severe power imbalances. It reveals how, in a
postcolonial context, interventions that impact basic rights to
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control land and resources gain external legitimacy through
crisis claims and calls for urgent action as well as through
familiar development narratives that highlight the needs
of recipients and the benevolent intent of interventions.
The familiarity of such apolitical narratives contributes to
their popularity and the power that they have to cover over
complex realities and painful conflicts. This narrative easily
overpowers and erases the deeply political and historically
grounded narratives of Gorongosa residents who are cut off
from the networks of influence, power, and control enjoyed
by park-based actors, government leaders, and conservation
advocates. The severe power imbalance that allows only one
narrative to circulate beyond Gorongosa further consolidates
the legitimacy of international conservation actors to intervene
in the area. Apolitical narratives obscure the ongoing and
heavily political conflict that is at play in Gorongosa where
those who have the most at stake—their land, their lives, their
livelihood—are given the least amount of control or authority
in park affairs.
Where severe power imbalances foster fundamentally
different interests in land and resources, divergent crisis
narratives are bound to emerge. As examination of this
case has revealed, in such circumstances, even when
conservation and development projects aim explicitly to
create collaborative partnerships with resident communities,
environmental crisis narratives tend to push project leaders
away from genuine attainment of such goals. With this in
mind, it is the responsibility of those in positions of greater
power to forge ways to deliberately work against dominant
narratives and rigid assessments of crisis. Focusing on the
power and consequences of crisis claims to generate narrative
fortresses highlights the need for conservation actors to
not simply consult with residents affected by conservation
schemes, but to create structures of genuinely collaborative
governance. It points to the need to think differently about
conservation so that residents of a protected area can
be respected as partners in strengthening existing land
management practices rather than as the source of destruction
or as objects of interventions. As the Gorongosa case reveals,
creating, circulating, and maintaining a ‘single story’ of
conservation and development visions through tight control
of park governance and public image does not, in the end,
lead to greater control over complex situations. Opening to a
diversity of experiences, positions, and forms of knowledge
has greater potential for breaking down narrative fortresses
and generating more effective and more just approaches to
land management.
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NOTES
1.

Gregory C. Carr is an entrepreneur and philanthropist from the USA.
He gained his fortune as co-founder in 1986 of Boston Technology,
which sold voice mail systems to telephone companies, and as chair
of Prodigy, an early global Internet service provider.

2.

The Carr Foundation states that its programme activities are
“dedicated to the environment, human rights and the arts.” The
project in Gorongosa National Park has become their primary
focus. See: http://www.carrfoundation.org/. After 2008, The
Carr Foundation project grew into a public-private partnership
with the Mozambican government and numerous other partners
(including the WWF, USAID, and numerous travel and tour
companies) and gained the title the Gorongosa Restoration
Project (GRP).

3.

A regulado is a local political administrative area. At the time
of this research Khanda was under the leadership of the régulo
Eugenio Almeida Canda.

4.

I regularly videoed weekly court sessions. One week, a
‘community meeting’ convened by park officials was scheduled
to coincide with the régulo’s weekly court. Despite the régulo’s
requests that I be permitted to film the proceedings, park
leadership presiding over the meeting prohibited me from
filming.

5.

In interviews published more recently, Greg Carr has been
encouraging journalists to focus their features on the work of
Mozambican nationals involved in the Gorongosa Restoration
Project. In an article that appeared in Travel Africa (Watt 2010),
Carr states, ‘the story of Gorongosa is not about Greg Carr, an
American, going over to Mozambique to save a national park…
Sure, a handful of foreigners showed up initially and there was some
international intervention, but we’ve moved beyond that now…’

6.

CBS is a major US commercial broadcast television and radio
network.

7.

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed
on October 29, 2008.

8.

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed
on October 29, 2008.

9.

http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed
on October 29, 2008.

10. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n; Accessed
on October 29, 2008.
11. http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5119851n. Accessed
on October 29, 2008
12. http://gorongosa.net/en/page/restoration/restoration-project.
Accessed on July 10, 2012.
13. Greg Carr, pers. comm.; Subject, Re: Mountain; September 19,
2005
14. Rich Beilfuss is currently President and CEO of the International
Crane Foundation.
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15. Rich Beilfuss, pers. comm.; September 21, 2005
16. Data continues to be scant and based on little more than casual
observations (see Walker, this issue).
17. In a recent version of the website, a phrase under a section titled
‘YOU CAN HELP!’ states, “We need your help in this important
campaign to protect Mount Gorongosa—one of Mozambique’s
most treasured natural wonders—before it’s too late.” See: http://
www.gorongosa.net/en/page/save_the_mountain/restore-themountain; Accessed on April 20, 2012.
18. ‘Fundação Carr’ is the Portuguese phrasing of ‘Carr Foundation’
19. Régulo is the Portuguese term used to refer to an area’s primary
‘traditional leader’ or ‘chief.’
20. Interview with Eugénio Almeida; December 22, 2006.
21. Chitengo is the headquarters of GNP.
22. Interview with Eugénio Almeida; December 22, 2006.
23. The symbolic power of Gorongosa Mountain as a place of
refuge and political opposition was renewed in Mozambique’s
public imagination in 2012 and 2013 when Afonso Dhlakhama,
leader of the opposition party Renamo, returned to re-establish
a base in Casa Banana on the southeastern side of the mountain.
This return was partly in response to mountain residents’ urgent
requests for Renamo leaders’ protection from the threat to
their land posed by the park’s official extension to Gorongosa
Mountain in 2011. Beginning in 2012, this base became a center
from which Renamo conducted military training, and made
public critiques of and demands of the ruling Frelimo party and
from which they launched numerous attacks in 2013.
24. Frelimo was the ruling party at independence, and Renamo
was an opposition army funded largely by neighboring white
minority-ruled governments in order to destabilise the newly
formed socialist state.
25. ‘Communities,’ here, is a term commonly used in the language of
staff and leaders of development organisations in Mozambique to
refer to residents of rural settlements. As Hughes has noted, the
term has come to replace Frelimo’s use of the word ‘peasantry’
(Hughes 2005). Thus, the term ‘community’ is a vague concept
whose referent invokes notions of harmony and homogeneity
that ‘works to disguise differential abilities to access power’
(West 2006: 36). It is also a political and ‘spatialised’ concept
that locates people in particular geographical areas (Smith 1992).
26. Interview with Celestino Sacaune Canda; October 30, 2006.
27. Interviewee anonymous; November 21, 2007.
28. Interviewee anonymous; December 22, 2006.
29. Interviewee anonymous; July 4, 2011.
30. Marty Sampson, Senior Consultant for GNP on Gorongosa
Mountain; pers. comm., June 22, 2011.
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